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Abstract
The question of how to stymie the proliferation of spyware on
computers has been a recurring topic of debate in Congress

SEARCH

and in the technology industry. With the passage of the SPY
ACT (H.R. 29) a high probability, this article highlights its

>>

prohibitions, with particular emphasis on how they change
current legal regimes. Most federal computer statutes—insofar
as they address actions victimizing private citizens—require

Shidler Center
UW School of Law

damage to the computer. In addition, one of the elements of
common law trespass to chattel is damage. Whether intended
or not, the SPY ACT subtly introduces a strict liability
component into federal computer and Internet law.
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<1>

Throughout 2004, a debate raged between Federal Trade

Commission (FTC) commissioners2 and Congress as to whether
legislation was required to stymie the disturbing prevalence of
spyware on computers. 3 To prove existing law adequate, the FTC
commenced the first spyware action against Sanford Wallace and
his affiliated corporations.4 Those in the computer industry also
expressed concern regarding the legislative approach, fearing
spyware would be defined as a type of software and prohibited,
and that certain beneficial technologies would thus be eliminated.
Heeding these warnings, Congress discarded the definitional
approach, choosing instead to prohibit questionable conduct 5
similar to that involved in FTC v. Seismic Entertainment
Productions, Inc. 6 The House overwhelmingly passed the SPY ACT
(H.R. 2929)7 in October 2004, but the Senate failed to vote
before the 108th Congress ended. As the 109th Congress
commenced, Representative Mary Bono immediately reintroduced
a slightly modified version bearing the same name. 8
<2>

New legislation yields two questions for practitioners: (1) are

new offenses created that may impact a client’s business model;
and (2) are new causes of action created to redress harm to an
individual’s property? The short answer to the latter is no,9 but
the answer to the former is more complicated. Although H.R. 29
does not create a cause of action for private redress, it outlines
specific conduct that expands liability in a subtle way; namely,
the Act does not require that the conduct damage or harm
property or the person in order to constitute a violation.
<3>

If H.R. 29 is considered a “privacy” bill, then this lack of

damage or harm element is nothing new. Other privacy statutes
enforced exclusively by the government, such as HIPAA, COPPA,
and Gramm-Leach-Bliley, do not require damage or harm to
persons or property to constitute a violation. But discussions
regarding the need for H.R. 29 frequently reference current laws
on computer crime or hacking, rather than existing privacy law.
As a result, the legal framework for approaching spyware
naturally focuses on theories of conversion, trespass, fraud, theft,
and federal statutes codifying these common law theories. Viewed
in this context, H.R. 29 is a departure from current laws
governing general computer crime and conduct on the Internet
where measurable harm or damage is almost always an element
of the offense. Those disseminating software having the
characteristics of spyware must consider the implications of the
privacy law approach taken by H.R. 29 and account for this subtle
expansion of liability.
<4>

This article analyzes the SPY ACT, particularly Sections 2 and

3, to determine its impact on common law and statutory regimes
relating to computer intrusion and deceptive practices in

http://www.lctjournal.washington.edu/Vol2/a017Braff.html[3/23/2010 8:53:07 AM]

The SPY ACT: Ditching Damages as an Element of Liability for On-Line Conduct Between Private Parties? >> Shidler Journal of Law, Commerce & Technology

preparation for what, by most accounts, is the inevitable passage
of federal legislation.10

CURRENT INTERNET LAW AND THE NECESSITY OF DAMAGE
<5>

In the U.S., laws governing action between private parties on

the Internet—whether common law trespass to chattel, or
statutes such as the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) 11 and
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) 12 —generally require
damage in order to be cognizable either civilly or criminally.

Common Law
<6>

At common law, a dispossession of or interference with

personal property is governed primarily by the theories of
conversion and trespass to chattel. Where the former involves
complete dispossession of property, the latter governs partial
disposition or interference “not sufficiently important to be classed
as conversion, and so to compel the defendant to pay the full
value of the thing with which he has interfered.”13 Under a
trespass to chattels theory, liability arises if there is dispossession
—regardless of whether there is harm or damage to the chattel—
or if “the chattel is impaired as to its condition, quality, or value,
or the possessor is deprived of the use of the chattel for a
substantial time.”14 Therefore, other than complete
dispossession, no legal protection is given for ‘harmless
intermeddlings’ unless they affect the possessor’s “materially
valuable interest in the physical condition, quality, or value” of
the chattel resulting in some harm exceeding the nominal or
dignitary. 15 Damage, therefore, is an element of liability.
<7>

In the context of electronic communications, the California

Supreme Court, in Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, found that Intel could
not maintain a trespass to chattels action against a former
employee for sending email messages to thousands of current
employees via company email accounts. This tort “does not
encompass … an electronic communication that neither damages
the recipient computer system nor impairs its functioning.” 16
Even though defendant Hamidi’s messages “temporarily used
some portion of the Intel computers’ processors or storage …
[Intel] does not demonstrate some measurable loss from the use
of its computer system.” 17 More importantly, the loss of
productivity, or time spent fending off interferences with a
computer’s ‘cycle time’ that individually fail to impair the
functionality of the computer cannot be “bootstrapped into injury
to [a] possessory interest in [a] computer.”18 In sum, individual
activities resulting in infinitesimal damage cannot form the basis
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for liability.

Federal Trade Commission Act
<8>

Spyware and adware often contain elements of fraud and

deception. The FTCA declares unlawful “unfair methods of
competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in or affecting commerce.” 19 Although extremely
broad, an act or practice is only “unfair” if it is “likely to cause
substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable
by consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing
benefits to consumers or competition.” 20 Adware that collects
information or monitors a user’s web surfing habits in order to
deliver targeted advertisements likely provides ‘clickwrap’
containing a privacy policy, end-user license agreement (EULA),
and/or a Terms of Use agreement. The FTC has taken
enforcement action against companies that have posted privacy
policies and failed to comply with them. 21 Nevertheless, the first
hurdle to FTC enforcement is a demonstration of substantial
injury, 22 which is often easily debatable as seen in FTC v.
ReverseAuction.com, Inc.23

Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
<9>

The CFAA “facilitates addressing in a single statute the

problem of computer crime.”24 It provides criminal sanctions for
offenses against government and private computers, as well as an
avenue for civil recourse for harm caused to private computers in
certain situations.25 The CFAA has evolved significantly since its
original manifestation as the Counterfeit Access Device and
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, which protected classified
information, financial records and credit information on
government and financial institution computers (federal interest
computers) from “unauthorized access” in addition to computer
crime involving interstate commerce. 26 The statute did not reach
harms to federal interest computers caused by other methods,
including harm resulting from access by an “authorized”
individual. 27 Civil penalties were added in 1994, allowing any
person suffering damage to their computers to maintain a civil
action. 28 In addition, the 1994 amendment “broadened the
proscribed range of conduct to transmissions,” thereby “shifting
the focus towards the defendant’s harmful intent and resulting
harm, rather than the technical concept of computer access and
authorization.” 29 The term protected computer, which defines the
subject of the CFAA’s protection, has since been substituted in
place of the federal interest computer.30 This is one example of
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Congress’s further broadening of the CFAA’s application.
<10>

This article concerns actions between private parties on the

Internet; therefore, it discusses only the sections of the CFAA
pertaining to private computers. For a private computer to be a
protected computer under CFAA, it must be used “in interstate or
foreign commerce or communication.” 31 A computer located
outside the U.S. can also be protected by the CFAA if it is “used
in a manner that affects interstate or foreign commerce or
communications of the United States.” 32 The advent of the
Internet has rendered almost all computer use interstate in
nature. All private computers infected with spyware are likely
protected computers, since the process of contracting and the
operation of spyware necessarily involve the Internet and
interstate commerce.
<11>

First, § 1030(a)(2)(c) of Title 18 punishes a person or entity

that “intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or
exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains … information
from any protected computer if the conduct involved an interstate
or foreign communication.” 33 Section 1030(b) prohibits attempts
to commit such an action, which does not require damages for
the government to bring an action. Rather, authorization—or a
lack thereof—substitutes for damage to the owner’s interest as a
critical element for violating this section of the CFAA. However,
this section does not necessarily enhance its utility in the context
of spyware and adware. Current interpretations of authorization
grant providers of this software a key defense because most
monitoring software is downloaded via bundling and with the
user’s consent.34 As discussed below, H.R. 29 may redefine what
constitutes authorization, even though violations of H.R. 29 are to
be enforced as unfair or deceptive trade practices under Section 5
of the FTCA. 35
<12>

Second, § 1030(a)(4) subjects to punishment any person

who “knowingly and with intent to defraud, accesses a protected
computer without authorization, or exceeds authorized access,
and by means of such conduct furthers the intended fraud and
obtains anything of value.”36 The “thing obtained” for value “may
not merely be the unauthorized use” of the computer.37
However, if the conduct consisted only of the use of the
computer, the value of such use must exceed $5,000 in any 1year period for the government to bring an action. 38
<13>

Finally, § 1030(a)(5) prohibits conduct that “intentionally

causes damage” by knowingly accessing or transmitting
information or code to a protected computer.

39

Here, damage is

defined as “any impairment to the integrity or availability of data,
a program, a system, or information.”40 Unlike § 1030(a)(2),
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information does not have to be obtained. A civil action for a
violation of the CFAA may be brought only if the conduct falls
under § 1030(a)(5) and involves $5,000 in “loss”41 to one or
more persons during a 1-year period; physical injury; threat to
public health or safety; or impairment of a medical examination,
diagnosis, treatment, or care of one or more individuals.42
<14>

The common and statutory laws addressed above are logical

avenues to redress conduct related to spyware. Such conduct
often seems to constitute unauthorized computer intrusion or an
intrusion that exceeds the user’s authorization (i.e., a mixture of
theft and trespass law modified by the CFAA to fit the virtual
world), or potentially unfair or deceptive trade practices. Such
conduct often yields a result that, in the aggregate, impairs the
chattel. However, these avenues have proven inadequate due in
part to their damage requirements. H.R. 29 subtly moves away
from insulating actions that fail to cause damage or harm and
instead moves toward prohibiting conduct based on a lack of
consent—or getting consent in an improper way.

THE SPY ACT: DITCHING DAMAGE AS AN ELEMENT OF LIABILITY FOR
PRIVATE PARTY CONDUCT
<15>

The trend away from requiring damage as an element for

unlawful conduct between private parties appears to have started
subtly with the CAN-SPAM Act, which does not require damage as
an element for its violation. 43 Punishment is predominantly based
upon whether the violator has committed prior offenses, whether
an offense under the Act was committed in furtherance of a
felony, and the volume of Spam 44 sent by the violator. One
penal provision does, however, provide for punishment by fine
and/or imprisonment where the offense “caused loss to one or
more persons aggregating $5,000 or more in value during any 1year period.”45 H.R. 29 continues this trend by rendering certain
conduct unlawful despite a lack of cognizable damage.

Prohibitions
<16>

Generally, the SPY ACT proscribes certain deceptive or

surreptitious conduct associated with the placement and utilization
of programs on a personal computer that monitor usage, collect
information, and modify settings. Although there are nine
categories of conduct prohibited in Section 2, a violation of the
Act can fall under no less than twenty specific provisions in
Sections 2 and 3. These are outlined in detail in Appendix A, and
are enumerated and summarized here for purposes of easy
reference. Sections 2 and 3 prohibit the following conduct by any
person not the owner or authorized user of a protected computer
(except Nos. 19 and 20, which also apply to the
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owner/authorized user):
1. Taking control of the computer to Spam others;
2. Taking control of the computer by diverting the
browser away from a website the user intended to
view;
3. Taking control of the computer via use of a dialer

46

or Internet connection or service;
4. Using the computer as part of a group of computers
(“bot farm”) to perform an activity;
5. Delivering ads using browser windows that will not
close;
6. Modifying the browser’s default homepage;
7. Modifying settings used to access or search the
Internet;
8. Modifying a browser’s bookmarks;
9. Modifying security or other settings that protect
information on the computer;
10. Collecting personally identifiable information via
keystroke logging function;
11. Inducing installation by giving an option to decline
software installation, but installing software even if it
is declined;
12. Preventing uninstallation or deactivation via use of a
Trojan47 that automatically reinstalls;
13. Procuring installation or information by
misrepresenting its necessity to access content;
14. Misrepresenting identity to procure installation or
execution of a program;
15. Misrepresenting identity to procure information
(personal, password, account);
16. Procuring information without the authority of the
intended recipient of the information;
17. Interfering with security, anti-spyware, or anti-virus
technology on the computer;
18. Installing a program with the intent of causing another
person to violate the act;
19. Transmitting an “information collection program”; and

http://www.lctjournal.washington.edu/Vol2/a017Braff.html[3/23/2010 8:53:07 AM]

The SPY ACT: Ditching Damages as an Element of Liability for On-Line Conduct Between Private Parties? >> Shidler Journal of Law, Commerce & Technology

20. Executing an “information collection program.”
<17>

Some of these prohibitions can be circumvented by procuring

authorization of either the owner of the computer (Nos. 2 and 18)
or the intended recipient of information (No. 16). This latter
provision may be used in situations similar to those in In re
DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litigation.48 In this case, even though
the placement of cookies 49 on the plaintiff class’s computers
constituted intentional access of a stored electronic
communication without authorization in violation of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, an exception is provided for conduct
authorized by a user of the electronic communications service:50
the affiliate web site who hired DoubleClick to deliver ads and
cookies to its visitors.51 The Wiretap Act provides a similar
exception, allowing for intentional intercepts of electronic
communications when one of the parties consents. 52

Provisions Allowing for Information Collection Programs, Exemptions &
Preemption
<18>

More importantly, transmitting (No. 19) or executing (No.

20) information collection programs can still occur, provided a
computer owner or authorized user is given the chance to “optin” after receiving proper notice and consent. An information
collection program is defined as software that either:
1. “collects personally identifiable information and sends
such information to a person other than the owner or
authorized user of the computer,” OR uses the
information to deliver advertising; OR
2. “collects information regarding the Web pages
accessed” in order to deliver advertising.53
The procedure for providing proper notice is outlined specifically
and needs only be given once unless the information collected is
“materially different” or “outside the scope” of previous
authorization. 54 Aside from notice, the only other requirement is
that the information collection program contains certain “required
functions.” These include an easily identifiable “disabling function”
allowing a user to uninstall or disable the program “without undue
effort or knowledge,” and an “identity function,” which provides a
logogram or trademark of the information collection program
when delivering advertisements while the owner or authorized
user is visiting a website other than that owned by the program
provider.55
<19>

The SPY ACT contains several other standard exemptions for
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law enforcement; carriers; operators; and providers of services to
monitor security, diagnostics, repair, or fraudulent activity. The
manufacturers and retailers of computer equipment are insulated
from liability for the third-party branded software that comes
installed on the computer. There is also a “Good Samaritan”
provision for those providers of computer software violating
sections 2 and 3 in order to remove the programs upon consent
of the computer owner.56 Finally, there is a somewhat murky
preemption regime. 57

Damage Requirements in the SPY ACT—Or Lack Thereof
<20>

The SPY ACT borrows its definition of damage from the

CFAA: “any impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a
program, a system, or information.”58 However, only 2 of the 20
prohibited actions (Nos. 3 and 4) actually require damage or
harm to the computer. The first (No. 3) involves the installation
of a dialer, 59 and the second (No. 4) involves “using the
computer as part of an activity performed by a group of
computers that causes damage to another computer”—in other
words, using it as part of a “bot farm.” 60 The other 18 prohibited
actions have no damage requirement. Although No. 9 refers to
“causing damage or harm,” this provision imposes a mens rea
requirement rather than an actual damage requirement. This
provision prohibits the modification of “security or other settings
of the computer that protect information about the owner or
authorized user for the purposes of causing damage or harm to
the computer or owner or user.”61 In addition, No. 18 prohibits
the installation of software components on another computer with
the intent of causing a person to use such components in a way
that violates any other provision of this section. The eventual use
of the software may require damage to violate the Act (if used to
violate Nos. 3 and 4), but violation of this section only requires
intent.62
<21>

By moving away from a regime based in part on damage or

harm (whether property or dignitary) in regulating conduct
between private parties, H.R. 29 substantially expands the
potential scope of liability. For instance, in applying the trespass
to chattels theory to the context of spyware and adware, certain
types of programs just use cycle time. For instance, the damage
element may be difficult to prove in cases of data miners, some
Trojans, and adware, because they often will not individually
impair the condition, quality, or value of a computer or deprive
the possessor of its use for a substantial time. According to the
logic of the California Supreme Court in Hamidi, damages resulting
from lost time in preventing such invasions cannot be
‘bootstrapped’ in order to satisfy the injury requirement of the
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tort because interests in time and productivity are separate from
the possessory interest in the computer. As a result, many
purveyors of spyware are able to operate with impunity under the
trespass to chattels theory. By largely eliminating the damage
element for many actions that would individually constitute
negligible harm, H.R. 29 shifts the default from no liability under
the trespass to chattels theory to strict liability for certain
conduct.
<22>

Conduct that would not currently result in liability under §

1030(a)(4)-(5) of the CFAA may also be actionable under
expanded authority granted to the FTC under H.R. 29. For
instance, under § 1030(a)(4), if conduct with intent to further
fraud comprised only the use of the computer, $5,000 in damage
related to such use must occur in any 1-year period for the
government to bring an action. However, H.R. 29 prohibits
“hijacking or otherwise using” the computer to “send unsolicited
information from the protected computer to others.”63 No
damages are required, even if this conduct was done with intent
to defraud.
<23>

Similarly, § 1030(a)(5)(A) prohibits the knowing

transmission of information or code to a protected computer or
accessing a protected computer; however, violation requires that
one or more of the five factors listed in § 1030(a)(5)(B) is also
satisfied: (1) damage ($5,000 in any 1-year period); (2)
impairment of a medical exam; (3) physical injury; (4) a threat to
public health or safety; or (5) any damage affecting a government
entity in furtherance of its administration of justice, national
defense, or national security. H.R. 29 appears to eliminate these
factors for the range of conduct outlined in the Act, thereby
imposing liability where it may not have existed before. For
instance, an individual or entity “knowingly transmitting”
information to a computer—such as an advertisement that the
user cannot close without turning off the computer (No. 5)64 —
would not be liable under § 1030(a)(5) because it is unlikely that
a factor under § 1030(a)(5)(B) would be satisfied. It would,
however, be actionable by the FTC under H.R. 29. Virtually all
conduct prohibited by H.R. 29 involves transmission of information
or code to a protected computer or accessing a protected
computer.
<24>

Accessing or exceeding authorized access to obtain

information from a protected computer under § 1030(a)(2) does
not require damage; however, H.R. 29 imposes very specific
requirements for securing consent/authorization to access a
computer for purposes of installing an information collection
program. One of the primary problems with adware and spyware
is that users often give tacit consent to the installation of such
programs by failing to read the fine print in EULAs or Terms of
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Use agreements. Where this may constitute authorization—and
therefore provide a defense to what would normally constitute a
violation of § 1030(a)(2)—H.R. 29 requires affirmative and
meaningful consent. In this respect, H.R. 29 narrows the
“authorization defense,” and consequentially expands the scope of
liability.
<25>

Finally, it is unclear how H.R. 29 will alter interpretation of

Section 5 of the FTCA. Acts or practices are only “unfair” or
“deceptive” if they are “likely to cause substantial injury to a
consumer which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers
themselves and is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to
consumers or competition.” 65 The FTC carefully chooses “test”
cases to guarantee a slam-dunk. In FTC v. Seismic Entertainment
Productions, Inc., Sanford Wallace and his affiliates sought to
market anti-spyware software after installing malicious spyware
on computers via a security flaw in the Internet Explorer Browser.
Once a user visited a seed web page, a series of processes
occurred almost instantaneously. Active content was used to
change the user’s default web page to the seed web page, which
contained a script to start this process each time the user opened
the browser. The seed page instructed the browser to retrieve
additional pages, which could not be closed, advertising antispyware software. Other windows were opened containing scripts
that altered the Windows registry and downloaded harmful active
content without consent. These included Trojan horse programs
that periodically contacted Internet hosts and allowed additional
programs to be downloaded. Ads would then be sent claiming that
the only way to fix the computer was to purchase Wallace’s antispyware program. 66 A temporary injunction was issued on Oct.
21, 2004.67
<26>

The conduct discussed herein, much of which is prohibited

under H.R. 29, has led those wary of a legislative solution to
argue it is unnecessary. However, what most consider to be
spyware—and the software that tends to be most prolific—does
not approach the devious nature involved in Seismic. Most such
software is adware, which primarily tracks web surfing history,
and most receive tacit consent for installation. For instance,
BargainBuddy and Internet Optimizer are programs that “hijack”
the browser’s error page and either serve up ads or redirect the
user to their websites. 68 Arguably this service does not “cause
substantial injury” for purposes of violating the FTCA because the
users are being directed to an actual site rather than an error
page. Under H.R. 29, however, diverting the browser away from a
site the user intended to view (error page or not) violates the
Act, which in turn is deemed an unfair and deceptive trade
practice under the FTCA despite a lack of damage to the
computer or injury to the consumer. 69
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CONCLUSION
<27>

The lack of a damage requirement is a relatively unique

phenomenon in the current legal regime regulating private party
conduct on the Internet. The actual impact it will have on bad
conduct associated with spyware is unclear given the enforcement
dilemmas associated with regulating conduct on the Internet.70
No private cause of action is provided by H.R. 29, and the murky
preemption regime eliminating authority of state attorneys general
to bring certain actions also render the bill’s impact on the
spyware problem questionable at best. Nevertheless, where there
is currently no legal redress for certain conduct, H.R. 29 may
impose consequences.

PRACTICE POINTERS
Scrutinize Your Client’s Notice and Consent
Statements: Consent will become the primary
mechanism to prevent run-ins with the FTC. Make
sure your client obtains consent in a clear notice
statement pursuant to § 3 of the Act if software is
used to collect a computer owner’s or authorized
user’s information—whether it is personally identifiable
information or website history.
Monitor the FTC’s Report on Cookies: Counsel
should monitor the FTC’s progress by reviewing its
“Report on Cookies,” which is mandated by § 8 of the
SPY ACT. Section 10 of the Act exempts cookies from
its definition of computer software, thereby preventing
cookies from being subject to the Act’s prohibitions.
While cookies have been recognized as “innocuous and
part of the basic functioning of most web sites,” there
is concern that more sophisticated “‘tracking’ or
‘persistent’ cookies collect identifying information and
increasingly act as spyware and adware.” 71 By
making the distinction between cookies and tracking
cookies, the SPY ACT is ambiguous as to whether the
latter are subject to the Act’s prohibitions or are also
exempt. The report is intended to “examine and
describe the methods by which such tracking cookies
and the websites that place them on computers
function separately and together, and the extent to
which they are covered or affected by this Act.” 72 The
report should clarify this issue and provide insight into
whether a cookie used by a client is exempt or
considered a tracking cookie.
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APPENDIX A: TABLE OF PROHIBITED CONDUCT UNDER H.R. 29
No.

Sec 2(a)
Sub. Sec.

1

1(A)
Taking
Control

2

1(B)
Taking

Shorthand Subject

1(C)

“hijacking or otherwise
using” the computer to
“send unsolicited
information from the
protected computer to
others”

No

No

Browser Diversion
Provision

diverting the Internet
browser away from a
website the user
intended to view
without authorization

Yes

No

Dialer Provision

“accessing or using the
modem or Internet
connection or service …
and thereby causing
damage to the
computer or causing
the owner or authorized
user or a third party
defrauded by such
conduct to incur
charges or other costs
for a service that is not
authorized by such
owner or authorized
user”

No

Yes

Bot Farm Provision

“using the computer as
part of an activity
performed by a group
of computers that
causes damage to
another computer”

No

Yes

Non-Closing Ad
Windows

“delivering
advertisements that a
user of the computer
cannot close without
turning off the
computer or closing all
sessions of the Internet
browser for the
computer”

No

No

Home Page
Changing

the Web page that
appears when launching
a browser or “similar
program used to access
and navigate the
Internet”

No

No

Access/Search/Other “the default provider
Internet connection
used to access or
settings
search the Internet, or
other existing Internet
connections settings”

No

No

Bookmark
Modification

“a list of bookmarks
used by the computer
to access Web pages”

No

No

Modification of
Security Settings

“security or other
settings of the
computer that protect
information about the

No

No

Taking
Control

4

1(D)
Taking
Control

5

1(E)
Taking
Control

6

2(A)
Modify
Settings

7

2(B)
Modify
Settings

8

2(C)
Modify
Settings

9

2(D)
Modify
Settings

Consent Damage
Provides Required
Defense
for
to
Violation
Liability

Spam Provision

Control
3

Language
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owner or authorized
user for the purposes of
causing damage or
harm to the computer
or owner or user”
10

3

11

4(A)

12

Keylogger Provision

“collecting personally
identifiable information
through the use of a
keystroke logging
function”

No

No

“inducing the owner or
authorized user to
install a computer
software component
onto the computer, or
preventing reasonable
efforts to block the
installation or execution
of, or to disable, a
computer software
component by – (A)
presenting the owner or
authorized user with an
option to decline
installation of a
software component
such that, when the
option is selected by
the owner or authorized
user or when the owner
or authorized user
reasonably attempts to
decline the installation,
the installation
nevertheless proceeds”

No

No

Trojan Provision

“causing a computer
software component
that the owner or
authorized user has
properly removed or
disabled to
automatically reinstall
or reactivate on the
computer”

No

No

Option to Decline
Installation that
Installation Really isn’t an
or
Option
Removal

4(B)

require.)

Installation
or
Removal

13

5

Unneeded Software/
Unneeded Password
Requirement

“misrepresenting that
installing a separate
software component or
providing log-in and
password information is
necessary for security
or privacy reasons, or
that installing a
separate software
component is necessary
to open, view, or play a
particular type of
content”

No

No

14

6

Impersonation to
Secure Installation

“inducing the owner or
authorized user to
install or execute
computer software by
misrepresenting the
identity or authority of
the person or entity
providing the computer
software to the owner
or user”

No

No

15

7(A)

Impersonation
Secure Information

“inducing the owner or
authorized user to
provide personally
identifiable, password,

No

No
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or account information
to another person (A)
by misrepresenting the
identity of the person
seeking the
information”
16

7(B)

Secure Information
w/o Authority of
Recipient

“inducing the owner or
authorized user to
provide personally
identifiable, password,
or account information
to another person (B)
without the authority of
the intended recipient
of the information”

Yes

No

17

8

Interfering with
Defenses

“removing, disabling, or
rendering inoperative a
security, anti-spyware,
or anti-virus technology
installed on the
computer”

No

No

18

9

Framing Someone
Else

“installing or executing
on the computer one or
more additional
computer software
components with the
intent of causing a
person to use such
components in a way
that violates any other
provision of this
section”

Depends

Depends
on Other
Section

No.

Sec 3(a)
Sub. Sec.

Shorthand Subject

Language

19

(a)(1)

Transmit
“Information
Collection Program”

“…it is unlawful for any
person – (1) to
transmit to a protected
computer, which is not
owned by such person
and for which such
person is not an
authorized user, any
information collection
program”

Execute
“Information
Collection Program”

“… it is unlawful for any
person – (2) to execute
any information
collection program
installed on such a
protected computer,
unless (A) before
execution of any of the
information collection
functions…”

Definition of
“Information
Collection Program”

Software that:

Unlawful
To:

20

(a)(2)
Unlawful
To:

(b)(1)

(PII Provision)

collects
personally
identifiable
information
and sends
such
information
to a
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Consent Damage
Provides Required
Defense
for
to
Violation
Liability
YES

NO

If 3(c) &
3(d)
Satisfied

YES

NO

If 3(c) &
3(d)
Satisfied

N/A

N/A
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person
other than
the owner
or
authorized
user of the
computer;
OR
(b)(2)

Definition of
“Information
Collection Program”
(Adware / Webpage
Monitoring)

N/A
collects
information
regarding
Web pages
accessed
using the
computer
AND uses
such
information
to deliver
advertising
to, or
display
advertising
on, the
computer.”

<< Top
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